Patients with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) suffer from severe decision-making deficits; even though their cognitive, memory, and problem-solving abilities remain intact, they are often unable to consider the consequences of their actions and to learn from their mistakes (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Bechara et al., 2000; Yechiam et al., 2005) . The most famous vmPFC patient, Phineas Gage, survived an accident in which an iron rod lesioned his frontal cortex, causing a profound change in his decision-making abilities and social behavior. Prior to the accident, Gage was a hard-working, efficient, and responsible railroad construction foreman. However, after his accident he could not resume work because his behavior was impulsive, impatient, and antisocial. 2 These symptoms are characteristic for vmPFC patients in general (Boes et al., 2011) ; vmPFC patients often make decisions that are irresponsible, risky, and go against their own interests. When confronted with a decision problem where the gains of immediate reward need to be weighted against the risks of long-term loss, vmPFC patients tend to focus on the immediate reward and disregard possible negative future outcomes of their choices, such as separation from family and friends, and loss of reputation and job (Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Dunn et al., 2006) .
In order to study the decision-making deficits of vmPFC patients, Bechara et al. (1994) developed the Iowa gambling task (IGT). The purpose of this task is to mimic real-life decision-making in an experimental context. In the IGT, participants are presented with four decks of cards; each card yields a reward and, occasionally, also a loss. Participants are told to repeatedly choose cards to optimize their long-term outcomes. Unbeknownst to the participants, two decks contain risky cards that have high immediate rewards but negative long-term outcomes, whereas the other two decks contain safe cards that have small immediate rewards but positive long-term outcomes. Participants can succeed on the IGT only when they learn to forego high immediate rewards and prefer the safe options over the risky options. This choice behavior is assumed to be characteristic for healthy participants and is taken as evidence that they base their choices on the long-term outcomes of the decks (Bechara et al., 1994) . In contrast, vmPFC patients presumably prefer the risky options because they are insensitive to the future consequences of their choices. The result of this "myopia for the future" is that the choice behavior of vmPFC patients is controlled primarily by immediate prospects, positive or negative (Bechara et al., 1994 (Bechara et al., , 2000 .
Over the last two decades, the IGT has become what is arguably the most popular neuropsychological paradigm to measure decision-making deficits in clinical populations (Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010) . To illustrate, a search for "Iowa gambling task" yields about 178,000 hits on Google, and about 3,640 hits on Google Scholar. 3 Prior to 2005, the IGT had already been used in almost 100 neurological and psychiatric studies (Bowman, Evans, & Turnbull, 2005) . Studies that use the IGT have involved a broad variety of clinical populations such as patients with vmPFC lesions (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Anderson, 1998; Bechara et al., 1999 Bechara et al., , 2000 , pathological gambling (Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, D'Annucci, & Bellodi, 2002) , obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cavedini, Riboldi, D'Annucci, et al., 2002) , psychopathic tendencies (Blair, Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001) , schizophrenia (Bark, Dieckmann, Bogerts, & Northoff, 2005; Martino, Bucay, Butman, & Allegri, 2007) , cocaine users (Stout, Busemeyer, Lin, Grant, & Bonson, 2004) , traffic offenders (Lev, Hershkovitz, & Yechiam, 2008) , and inmates (Yechiam, Kanz, et al., 2008) . The traditional way to compare performance of a clinical group to that of a control group is based either on the overall proportion of choices from the good decks, or on a difference score between the overall proportion of choices from the good and bad decks. Note that these procedures collapse choice proportions over the two good decks and over the two bad decks, leading to a loss of potentially diagnostic information (Chiu & Lin, 2007; Dunn et al., 2006; Lin, Chiu, Lee, & Hsieh, 2007) , a point to which we will return later.
In addition to the broad application of the IGT in neuropsychological studies, Bechara (2007) promote to use the IGT in clinical assessment of patients with decision-making deficits. Bechara therefore developed IGT software including a professional manual. The software yields different normative scores, such as the total net gain and the total number of cards chosen from each deck. These normative scores can be compared to those of a demographically corrected sample or U.S. census-matched sample. According to Bechara, the IGT is "ideal to assess patients who exhibit poor decision-making skills in the presence of otherwise normal or unaffected intelligence because of head injury or insult or any other condition thought to impact the function of the prefrontal cortex". 4
The validity of IGT scores as a diagnostic instrument hinges on at least three assumptions about the performance of healthy participants on the IGT. First, there is the explicit assumption that healthy participants learn to prefer the good options over the bad options (Bechara et al., 1994) ; Second, there is the implicit assumption that choice performance for healthy participants is homogeneous-a clinical test in which healthy participants have widely diverging scores is of limited use; Third, there is the explicit assumption that healthy participants first explore the different options, and then settle down and exploit the most profitable ones (i.e., the exploration-exploitation tradeoff; Bechara et al., 1994) .
The goal of this article is to assess the validity of the above assumptions using two extensive reviews of the literature and detailed analysis of eight experimental data sets. To anticipate the conclusion, our results call into question each of the above assumptions: First, the choices of healthy participants are primarily driven by the frequency of losses rather than the long-term outcomes of the decks (i.e., the frequency-of-losses effect); Second, the performance of healthy participants is characterized by a considerable variability, both across groups and across participants within groups; Third, healthy participants fail to show a pronounced exploration-exploitation tradeoff.
The outline of this article is as follows. The first section explains the IGT, outlines the assumptions about the IGT performance of healthy participants, and reviews current criticism on the IGT. The second section tests each of the three key assumptions above by reviewing findings from 39 groups of healthy participants and by analyzing data from eight IGT studies. Section 3 summarizes our findings and discusses their ramifications.
The Iowa Gambling Task

Description of the Iowa Gambling Task
The purpose of the IGT is to measure decision-making deficits of clinical populations in an experimental setting. The IGT mimics real-life decision-making in the sense that participants are required to integrate rewards and losses, weight benefits and risks associated with each possible option, remember that information and use it in subsequent decisions. In the traditional IGT, participants are initially given $2000 facsimile money and are presented with four decks of cards. Participants are told to successively choose cards from the four decks to maximize their long-term outcome (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997) .
In the IGT, each card is associated with a specific amount of monetary reward and potentially also of monetary loss. The difference between the four decks lies in the payoff scheme: Two decks (decks A and B) are associated with high immediate, constant rewards, but with even higher unpredictable, occasional losses resulting in negative long-term outcomes. Decks A and B are therefore called bad or disadvantageous decks. The other two decks (decks C and D) are associated with lower immediate, constant rewards, but with even lower unpredictable, occasional losses and thus result in positive long-term outcomes. Decks C and D are therefore called good or advantageous decks. In addition to the different magnitude of the immediate rewards and occasional losses resulting in different long-term outcomes, the decks also differ in the frequency of losses: Two decks yield frequent losses (decks A and C) and two decks yield infrequent losses (decks B and D) . The payoff scheme of the traditional IGT as developed by Bechara et al. (1994) is presented in Table 2 .1. Each time participants choose a card, they receive feedback on the reward and the loss (if any) associated with that card, and the running tally. Figure 2 .1 shows an example screen shot of the IGT. Participants are not told how long the task takes, but typically it contains 100 trials. The task aims to determine whether participants learn through trial and error to prefer the good, safe decks (i.e., decks C and D) over the bad, risky decks (i.e., decks A and B).
IGT performance is typically recorded for a clinical group and a control group. Different outcome measures have been reported, but most studies compute either the overall proportion of choices from the good decks or a difference score between the overall proportion of choices from the good and bad decks. An overall proportion of choices from the good decks larger than .50 or a positive difference score are considered as non-impaired performance (Bechara et al., 1998 (Bechara et al., , 1999 Bowman & Turnbull, 2003) . The disadvantage of these outcome measures is that they do not reflect the change in the deck preferences across trials. Therefore, many studies report these outcome measures also in blocks of 10 to 20 trials. These trial-dependent outcome measures are often entered in a block x group analysis of variance (ANOVA). Note that these procedures collapse choice proportions over the two good decks and over the two bad decks (Chiu & Lin, 2007; Dunn et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2007) . Bechara et al. (1994) developed the IGT to measure decision-making deficits of patients with vmPFC lesions. According to Bechara et al. (1994 Bechara et al. ( , 2000 , these brain-damaged patients perform poorly on the IGT because they are insensitive to the future consequences of their actions ("myopia for the future"). Performance of vmPFC patients is therefore assumed to be guided by immediate prospects, positive or negative, rather than the accumulation of long-term positive outcomes (Bechara et al., 1994 (Bechara et al., , 2000 . Such myopic choice behavior results in a preference for the bad, risky decks, that is, those decks that yield constant high immediate rewards but even higher unpredictable losses (i.e., decks A and B); hence, this choice behavior leads to long-term negative outcomes. Healthy participants, on the other hand, are assumed to prefer the good, safe decks (i.e., decks C and D) because they correctly infer that these decks yield positive long-term outcomes, despite rather small immediate rewards (Bechara et al., 1994) . Figure 2 .2 displays the mean proportion of choices from each deck in Bechara et al. (1994) 's control group of healthy participants (N = 44). This figure illustrates that the control group showed a strong overall preference for the good decks, and thus clearly supports the assumption of Bechara et al. (1994) that healthy participants prefer the good decks due to their positive long-term outcomes. It is important to note that this group of healthy participants chose both good decks and both bad decks about equally often, indicating that these participants do not prefer the decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D) over the decks with frequent losses (decks A and C).
Assumptions Underlying Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task
In order to support their assumptions about the characteristic choice behavior of healthy participants across trials, Bechara et al. (1994) presented deck selection profiles of two typical control participants (cf. Figure 2 .3). These profiles illustrate that these control participants "initially sampled all decks (. . .), but eventually switched to more and more selections from the good decks C and D, with only occasional returns to decks A and B" (Bechara et al., 1994, p. 12) . In the case of Bechara et al. (1994)'s two typical control participants, the last 50 trials featured only five and six choices from the bad decks (cf. Figure 2 The difference in the performance of healthy participants and vmPFC patients has been frequently interpreted as support of the somatic marker hypothesis. This hypothesis states that emotion-related signals generated from the body, so-called somatic markers, regulate decision-making. Especially in complex, uncertain situations, somatic markers are assumed to mark the possible options with an emotional signal related to the goodness or badness of the associated outcome. Based on these emotional signals, healthy participants anticipate certain bodily states associated with each response option (Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara & Damasio, 2002; A. R. Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996) . These expectations are assumed to guide decisions by restricting the decision-making space to options associated with positive affective states. Crucially, vmPFC patients are found to be unable to rely on somatic markers when facing multiple response options (Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara & Damasio, 2002) . This inability is assumed to lead to poor decision-making (but see Dunn et al., 2006; Maia & McClelland, 2004 for critiques).
In sum, the basic assumption underlying the IGT is that patients with vmPFC lesions prefer the bad decks because of their "myopia for the future", whereas healthy participants base their choices on the long-term outcomes and therefore gradually learn to prefer both good decks.
Current Criticism on the Iowa Gambling Task
Despite its frequent use, the IGT has been confronted by a growing body of criticism. It is increasingly apparent that even healthy participants perform poorly because they fail to develop a preference for both good options, contradicting the assumptions of Bechara et al. (1994) . More specifically, many studies have shown that healthy participants prefer the decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D) indicating that healthy participants base their choices on the frequency of losses rather than on the long-term outcomes (Caroselli, Hiscock, Scheibel, & Ingram, 2006; Dunn et al., 2006; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; Lin et al., 2007; Wilder, Weinberger, & Goldberg, 1998; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005) . Caroselli et al. (2006) even concluded that "the card selection preferences of undergraduates were more similar to those of Bechara et al. (1994) 's seven patients with frontal lobe damage than to those of their 44 normal controls" (p. 208).
Studies applying the Soochow gambling task (SGT)-a variation of the IGT in which both good options yield high-frequent losses and both bad options yield low-frequent losses-show that healthy participants prefer the bad options over the good options, indicating again that healthy participants base their choices on the frequency of losses (Ahn et al., 2008; Chiu et al., 2008) . The frequency-of-losses effect has also been found in a different version of the IGT in which Chiu and Lin (2007) established a higher contrast between rewards and losses on each trial by increasing their magnitude while keeping the traditional long-term outcomes (i.e., −250 for 10 cards from the bad decks, and +250 for 10 cards from the good decks). Chiu and Lin (2007) conclude that "the IGT contains some redundant procedures, confounding features, and problems in interpretation" (p. 9) and that "these problems should be refined to make the IGT a truly useful assessment tool" (p. 9). Further evidence for the frequency-of-losses effect in healthy participants has been reported by Huizenga, Crone, and Jansen (2007) who showed that the dominant IGT strategy in the considered age groups ranging from 6 to 25 years is to focus on the frequency of losses, a dominance that increases with age.
It is important to note that for many published IGT studies, the selection proportions for the two good decks and the two bad decks have been collapsed. This presentation method obscures the impact of the frequency-of-losses effect (Chiu & Lin, 2007; Dunn et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2007) . In this article we aim to overcome this complication by reviewing the literature that does contain information from each individual deck, by re-analyzing raw data of previous IGT studies that we received upon request, and by collecting data from a relatively large sample of healthy participants.
Literature Reviews and Data Analyses
In this section we assess the three key assumptions about the performance of healthy participants on the IGT. Our analyses below provide evidence for three findings that run counter to the key IGT assumptions. First, the primary factor that drives deck selections is frequency-of-losses instead of an appreciation of long-term outcomes. Second, IGT performance is characterized by a considerable variability, both across groups and across participants within groups. Third, healthy participants fail to progress from an initial stage of exploration to a later a stage of exploitation.
Methods
In order to test the assumptions of Bechara et al. (1994) about the choice behavior of healthy participants on the IGT, we undertook three steps: We conducted two literature reviews, analyzed seven published data sets, and analyzed a large data set collected by ourselves (N = 162).
Literature review I: Choices from each deck separately
Our first literature review focuses on the mean proportion of choices from each of the four decks. The aim of this literature review was to quantify the size of the frequency-of-losses effect in healthy participants, defined here as participants that do not have any neurological impairments and that are typically used as control participants. We tried to locate any study that reported the mean proportion of choices from each deck separately. These studies were located by searching for IGT studies published before July 1, 2011 in ISI Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar (search term: "Iowa gambling task"), and by searching the references of relevant articles.
We restricted this literature review to studies that presented the mean proportion of choices from each of the four decks in the text or tables, or provided figures that enabled us to extract this information. For maximum compatibility, we only included IGT studies that used a procedure and payoff scheme close to the ones described by Bechara et al. (1994) . This means that we only included studies that used facsimile money, that yielded a net outcome of −250 for the bad decks and +250 for the good decks in every 10 card unit, that used two high-frequent losses decks (i.e., decks A and C) and two low-frequent losses decks (i.e., decks B and D), and that used the same reward structure within the good decks and within the bad decks. Our first literature review involves 17 studies covering a total of 479 healthy participants.
Literature review II: Choices from the good and bad decks
Our second literature review focuses on the mean proportion of choices from the good and bad decks. The aim of this literature review was to quantify the variability between groups of healthy participants. We therefore searched for IGT studies reporting the mean proportion of choices from the good and bad decks. These studies were located by searching for IGT studies published before July 1, 2011 in ISI Web of Knowledge and Google Scholar (search term: "Iowa gambling task").
We restricted this literature review to studies that presented the mean proportion of choices from the good and bad decks in the text or tables, or provided figures that enabled us to extract this information. The inclusion criteria are the same as described for the first literature review, such as only IGT studies that used a procedure and payoff scheme close to the ones described by Bechara et al. (1994) . Our second literature review involves 39 groups with a total of 1427 healthy participants. Because of the vast number of published IGT studies this review is not exhaustive; however, we considered it large enough to address our research question. To the best of our knowledge, our review of healthy participants' performance on the IGT is the most comprehensive to date.
Published data sets
We emailed all corresponding authors of the studies included in at least one of the literature reviews and requested the data of the healthy participants. Despite three attempts to contact the authors, we only received seven data sets that contained the information we needed. Table 2 .2 gives an overview of all groups of healthy participants included in the literature reviews and specifies in which literature review each group is included and whether the data have been obtained or not. Data are labeled as not available if the data could no longer be located, if the complete format of the data was not available (e.g., only available collapsed over the two good decks and the two bad decks), or if the authors did not sent us the data by the time we completed this manuscript. The data provided by Wood, Busemeyer, Koling, Cox, and Davis (2005) 
Own data set
We conducted an experiment that featured 162 healthy participants (82 female) performing a 100-trial IGT. We used a computerized version of the IGT with facsimile money and the payoff scheme as developed by Bechara et al. (1994) . The mean age of all participants was 25.56 years (SD = 4.86). Female participants had a mean age of 25.52 years (SD = 5.32), and male participants of 25.60 years (SD = 4.37). All participants reported an unremarkable neurological history and were paid for their participation.
Evidence Against Assumption I: Frequency-of-Losses Effect
Literature review I: Choices from each deck separately
In order to assess whether the choices of healthy participants are guided primarily by the long-term outcomes of the decks, we conducted a literature review on the overall proportion of choices from each of the four decks. Only 17 studies with a total of 479 participants met our inclusion criteria; Table 2 .3 shows the mean proportion of choices from each deck for each of the studies separately.
Out of these 17 studies, 13 studies report that deck B (i.e., the bad deck with infrequent losses) is chosen more often or about as often as deck C or D (i.e., the two good decks). The remaining four studies show that healthy participants tend to prefer the good decks. One of these four studies is the study of Bechara et al. (1994) ; note that none of the remaining three studies yielded an overall preference for the good decks that is stronger than the one reported by Bechara et al. (1994) .
The frequency-of-losses effect is evident from a consideration of the weighted mean proportion of choices from the different decks (i.e., deck A: .19, deck B: .28, deck C: .24, deck D: .29)-participants prefer the decks with infrequent losses over the decks with frequent losses. These findings suggest that the choices of healthy participants are primarily influenced by the frequency of losses rather than the expected valence of the decks.
Experimental data
The seven received data sets and our own data set enabled us to consider the mean proportion of choices from each deck as a function of trial number, as displayed in Figure 2 .4. This figure shows that only the data set of Premkumar et al. (2008) supports the importance of long-term outcomes for deck selection frequencies; in this data set, healthy participants gradually develop a preference for both good decks (i.e., decks C and D) over both bad decks. The remaining data sets instead support the frequency-of-losses effect. Some data sets show a pronounced frequency-of-losses effect with a clear preference for both decks with infrequent losses (i.e., decks B and D) over both decks with frequent losses (i.e., Fridberg et al., 2010; Rodríguez-Sánchez et al., 2005 ; our own data set). Other data sets show a less pronounced frequency-of-losses effect, indicating that, at the end of the IGT, participants choose about equally often from decks B, C, and D, while clearly avoiding deck A (i.e., Fernie & Tunney, 2006; Kjome et al., 2010; Wood et al., 2005) . In the data set of Toplak et al. (2005) , participants show a slight preference for decks with infrequent losses over the decks with frequent losses during the entire sequence of trials, however, at the end of the IGT participants choose about equally often from all decks. Table 2 .4 summarizes the information of Figure 2 .4 by presenting the overall mean proportion of choices from each deck. The weighted mean proportion of choices from each deck of the seven received data sets and our own data set underscore the frequency-of-losses effect (i.e., deck A: .17, deck B: .31, deck C: .21, deck D: .31) and thus corroborate the findings of the first literature review (Table 2. 3). (1994) ; these studies nevertheless met our inclusion criteria since they maintained the traditional net outcomes and the traditional frequency of losses structure, and the reward structure stayed the same within the good decks and within the bad decks. 
Evidence Against Assumption II: High Variability in Performance Between and Within Groups
Literature review II: Choices from the good and bad decks
In order to assess whether the choices of healthy participants are relatively consistent between groups, we conducted a literature review on the mean proportion of choices from the good decks (i.e., decks C and D) and the bad decks (i.e., decks A and B). Table 2 .5 presents the mean proportion of choices from good and bad decks for all groups included in our second literature review, and Figure 2 .5 presents the histogram of the corresponding mean proportion of choices from the good decks. From the table and the figure, it is evident that the majority of the studies reported a weak overall preference for the good decks (i.e., between 50% and 60% choices from the good decks), and that some studies even reported an overall preference for the bad decks. Few studies reported a pronounced overall preference for the good decks, and none reported a preference for the good decks that is as strong as the one reported by Bechara et al. (1994) . Our second literature review reveals substantial between-group variability in deck preference. In addition, the review underscores that the performance of healthy participants is generally much worse than initially reported by Bechara et al. (1994) . It is especially striking that the majority of the studies reports a weak overall preference for the good decks. The strong evidence for the frequency-of-losses effect, discussed in the last section, suggests that a weak overall preference for (1994) ; these studies nevertheless met our inclusion criteria since they maintained the traditional net outcomes and the traditional frequency of losses structure, and the reward structure stayed the same within the good decks and within the bad decks. a Sample sizes might be lower than in Table 2 , 3, and 5 due to incomplete received data sets. b Weighted by the sample size of each study. Figure 2 .5: Literature review II: Histogram of the mean proportion of choices from good decks (i.e., decks C and D) of 39 groups of healthy participants. The majority of the groups shows a weak overall preference for the good decks while some groups show an overall preference for the bad decks and a few groups show a pronounced overall preference for the good decks, as reported by Bechara et al. (1994) . the good decks may only be due to a summing effect. For example, the data of Fridberg et al. (2010) show that healthy participants prefer the good decks over the bad decks (i.e., .57 vs. .43, see Table 2 .5). This finding is underscored by the left panel of Figure 2 .6 that presents the mean proportion of good and bad choices as a function of trial number (cf. Figure 1 in Fridberg et al., 2010) . This panel shows that the proportion of good choices increases as the number of trials increases, and leads the authors to conclude that "Controls subsequently learned to select from the advantageous decks" (Fridberg et al., 2010, p. 31) . However, this conclusion is mainly due to a summing effect, and hides the frequency-of-losses effect, as can be seen in our first literature review where the mean proportion of choices from each deck were presented separately (i.e., deck A: .13, deck B: .30, deck C: .14, deck D: .43; Table 2 .3). The right panel of Figure 2 .6 (cf. Figure 2 in Fridberg et al., 2010) displays the mean proportion of choices from each deck as a function of trial number. This figure shows that the decks with infrequent losses (i.e., decks B and D) are at any point during the IGT preferred over the decks with frequent losses (i.e., decks A and C). The reason why the control participants appear to learn to prefer the good decks is that the choices from deck D strongly increase whereas the choices from the other three decks slowly decrease; nevertheless, deck B is still chosen much more often than deck A or C at any point during the IGT. This example illustrates how collapsing the choices from the good decks and from the bad decks might hide the frequency-of-losses effect and highlights the importance of analyzing the choice behavior of each deck separately. While reviewing the literature, we also noticed that some studies report a high within-group variability in the performance of healthy participants on the IGT. We found six studies that explicitly reported the number of healthy participants that showed impaired performance (i.e., overall preference for the bad decks). Table 2 .6 lists these six studies and the corresponding number and percentage of healthy participants with impaired performance. This table points out that a a These participants were classified as impaired because they performed within the range of vmPFC patients. b These participants even made ≥ 70% choices from the bad decks.
Proportion of Choices from the Good Decks
substantial number of healthy participants perform poorly on the IGT, suggesting that there is high within-group variability in the performance of healthy participants in these six studies. Moreover, the table suggests that a substantial number of participants violate the assumption that healthy participants prefer the good decks over the bad decks.
In sum, the performance of healthy participants on the IGT is characterized by high variability between groups: In some studies healthy participants seem to behave according to the assumptions of Bechara et al. (1994) by expressing a strong preference for the good decks; however, in most studies the preference for the good decks is relatively weak, and in some studies healthy participants express a preference for the bad decks, in complete contradiction to the assumptions that underlie the IGT. In addition, a few data sets suggest that there may also be substantial variability across participants within the same study, a finding we will return to in more detail in the next section.
Experimental data
The extent of within-group variability in performance of healthy participants can be understood best by an individual-participants analysis of deck selection profiles. Figure 2 .7 shows the deck selection profiles of five participants in our own data set. This figure illustrates that choice behavior differs dramatically between the five healthy participants: The first participant keeps switching between all decks and does not develop a preference for any deck; the second participant seems to develop a preference for the bad decks with occasional switches to deck C; the third and fourth participant both develop a preference for decks B and D, but the third participant tends to stay longer at the same deck than the fourth participant; finally, the fifth participant develops a preference for deck B and only rarely switches to decks C or D. These individual deck selection profiles suggest that each participant displays a highly idiosyncratic choice behavior. The deck selection profiles of all available data sets further underscore the substantial within-group variability, as can be seen in the online appendix containing a total of 394 individual deck selection profiles from six different studies. 5 The extent of within-group variability can be further assessed by determining the number of participants that perform in the deficient range i.e., > 50% choices from the bad decks. Table 2 .7 presents the number and percentage of healthy participants with impaired performance in each data set that was sent to us upon request, and in our own data set. From this table, it is apparent that a Bechara et al. (1994) ; these studies nevertheless met our inclusion criteria since they maintained the traditional net outcomes and the traditional frequency of losses structure, and the reward structure stayed the same within the good decks and within the bad decks.
substantial number of healthy participants-in some studies, even the majority of the participantsperform deficiently on the IGT. This table corroborates the findings from Table 2 .6 and Figure 2 .7:
The performance of healthy participants is characterized by high within-group variability, and a substantial number of participants violate the assumption that healthy participants prefer the good decks over the bad decks. Bechara et al. (1994) assume that healthy participants first explore all decks, then switch to the good decks, and only occasionally return to the bad decks. In a reinforcement-learning context (Sutton & Barto, 1998) , this means that healthy participants progress from an initial stage of exploration to a later stage of exploitation. This assumption implies that the number of switches decreases as the number of trials increases. However, the available data sets fail to support this assumption. Figure 2 .8 shows the mean proportion of switches as a function of trial number. The data sets of Premkumar et al. (2008) and Wood et al. (2005) show a slight decrease in the mean proportion of switches across trials; however, this decrease is not as pronounced as assumed by Bechara et al. (1994) who showed that, in the case of two typical healthy participants, the last 10 trials featured only one and no switch (cf. Figure 2. 3). In the remaining data sets, the mean proportion of switches remains surprisingly stable. Therefore, Figure 2 .8 supports the conclusion that healthy participants fail to progress from an initial stage of exploration to a later stage of exploitation. 6 In a reinforcement-learning context (Sutton & Barto, 1998) , this suggests that participants failed to learn about the relative value of the choice options that they have available.
Evidence Against Assumption III: Absence of a Pronounced Exploration-Exploitation Tradeoff
Discussion
This article focused on performance of healthy participants on the IGT. Two literature reviews and the analysis of eight data sets together challenge the assumptions of Bechara et al. (1994) ; these studies nevertheless met our inclusion criteria since they maintained the traditional net outcomes and the traditional frequency of losses structure, and the reward structure stayed the same within the good and bad decks.
about the IGT choice behavior of healthy participants. Our findings reveal the presence of a frequency-of-losses effect in healthy participants, as already indicated by many studies (Ahn et al., 2008; Caroselli et al., 2006; Chiu & Lin, 2007; Chiu et al., 2008; Dunn et al., 2006; Huizenga et al., 2007; MacPherson et al., 2002; Lin et al., 2007; Wilder et al., 1998; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005) . In addition, we showed that performance of healthy participants is characterized by considerable variability, both across groups and across participants within the same study, and that healthy participants fail to progress from an initial stage of exploration to a later stage of exploitation. These findings clearly contradict the common belief that "most healthy participants sample cards from each deck, and after about 40 or 50 selections are fairly good at sticking to the good decks". 7 This evidence against the key IGT assumptions suggests that IGT scores may not serve as a valid measure of decision-making deficits in clinical populations, for two different reasons (cf. Dunn et al., 2006) . First, the high variability in healthy participants' performance complicates the prevailing interpretation of IGT data. Specifically, conclusions about deficient choice performance in clinical populations depend strongly on the performance of the control group. For instance, the absence of a difference between a clinical and control group may be due to intact decision-making ability in the clinical group, or it may be due to poor performance of the control group (Dunn et al., 2006) .
Second, our findings question the ecological validity of IGT scores. Since a substantial number of healthy participants perform poorly on the IGT, but likely do not show any decision-making deficits in real life, it is unclear to what extent IGT scores measure everyday, real-life decision making (Dunn et al., 2006) .
Our analysis demonstrated that, in order to reveal the frequency-of-losses effect and accurately describe the learning process, it is important that future studies analyze the choice behavior as a function of the trial number from each deck separately. One way to capture the learning process is to apply trend analyses (e.g., a linear or quadratic contrast) on the choice pattern from each deck (Dunn et al., 2006; Premkumar et al., 2008) .
Our results showed that many healthy participants perform poorly on the IGT, begging the question as to why they do not learn to prefer both good decks over both bad decks. Altogether, it seems that many participants find it particularly difficult to figure out that deck B is a bad deck-after all, deck B yields high immediate, constant rewards. One explanation for why healthy participants do not learn to prefer both good decks over deck B is related to the payoff scheme as developed by Bechara et al. (1994) . As first pointed out by Lin et al. (2007) , cards from deck C never yield a net loss, but cards from deck A do. This goes against Bechara et al. (1994) 's idea of designing one good deck and one bad deck with high-frequent losses and suggests that the good decks and bad decks are pseudo-balanced. Decks B, C, and D are more similar than expected because they yield either no or very few net losses, whereas deck A yields frequent and big net losses and is thus the only deck that clearly differs from the others with respect to the net outcomes. Another explanation is that the payoff scheme encourages participants to only focus on the immediate losses; the losses vary but the immediate rewards are completely predictable as they are constant across trials for each deck. The predictability of immediate rewards also contradicts Bechara et al. (1994)'s intention of "uncertainty of reward and punishment" (p. 8).
Another explanation for the surprisingly poor performance of healthy participants is a lack of motivation. Indications for a lack of motivation can be seen in the individual deck selection profiles, as shown in Figure 2 .7 and in the online appendix. Studying these profiles, it seems impossible to identify a learning process for the majority of the participants. Many participants keep switching between the decks, irrespective of the occurrence of losses and of the long-term outcomes of the decks. However, Fernie and Tunney (2006) have shown that participants do not perform better when they are more motivated to do well (i.e., by using real money vs. facsimile money); instead, participants did improve when they were given more information about the task (i.e., some decks are worse than others, most money is made when the poor options are avoided). This suggests that it is the difficulty of the IGT rather than the lack of motivation that contributes to a poor performance of healthy participants.
One final explanation for the poor performance of healthy participants is that 100 trials are not enough to learn much about the nature of the decks. In support of this conjecture, Wetzels, Vandekerckhove, et al. (2010) showed that healthy participants do learn to prefer the good decks over the bad decks, but that they require at least 100 trials to do so. The reason for the slow learning process might be the infrequent occurrence of losses in decks B and D (i.e., once in 10 cards), providing participants with too little information to learn quickly that deck B should be avoided.
It is still unclear what accounts for the relatively poor performance of clinical populations on the IGT. It may be that clinical populations are even more susceptible to the frequency-of-losses effect than healthy participants are. It may also be that clinical populations are primarily driven by the immediate prospects of the decks, as originally proposed by Bechara et al. (1994) . In order to understand the factors that determine the choices on the IGT, one possibility is to fit a multivariate normal mixture model to clinical samples and samples of healthy participants (cf. Huizenga et al., 2007) . This analysis allows one to identify groups that use distinct IGT decision strategies, such as focusing on the frequency of losses, focusing on immediate rewards, or focusing on long-term outcomes. Such an analysis does not explain the learning process and therefore requires a relatively long IGT. Another possibility to determine the factors driving performance on the IGT is to apply a formal model that explicitly describes how the learning process unfolds over time (e.g., Busemeyer & Stout, 2002) .
In sum, we showed that the IGT is characterized by several anomalous phenomena that go against the assumptions of the prevailing theory (Bechara et al., 1994) . Specifically, performance of healthy participants is primarily influenced by the frequency of losses rather than the long-term outcomes; moreover, performance of healthy participants is highly idiosyncratic, and often lacks a tendency to first explore decks and then exploit those that are most attractive. These anomalies question the extent to which IGT scores measure real-life decision-making deficits and complicate the prevailing interpretation of IGT data. Our findings suggest that the IGT needs to be reevaluated before being accepted as convincing tool to measure decision-making deficits in clinical populations.
